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Abstract 
A positive safety culture can lead to a decrease in organizational injury and disaster statistics 
as well as the costs associated from those injuries.  A safety culture literature review 
suggested there were some constructs that needed expansion and inclusion within safety 
culture measurements.  A 92-item survey was constructed by subject matter experts based on 
their knowledge and literature.  The resulting survey was administered to 25,574 workers 
across five multinational organizations in five different industries.  The data set was split in 
half before exploratory and hierarchical confirmatory factor analyses were conducted.  These 
analyses revealed Safety Culture as a second-order latent variable with four first-order factors 
consisting of Management Concern, Personal Responsibility for Safety, Peer Support for 
Safety, and Safety Management Systems.  Additionally, twelve indicators were found: three 
on Management Concern, three on Personal Responsibility, two on Peer Support, and four on 
Safety Management Systems.  The resulting safety culture model addresses gaps in the 
literature by pinpointing core factors which make up a safety culture. 
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A Hierarchical Factor Analysis of a Safety Culture Survey 
Safety culture has received increased attention since the Occupational Safety and 
Health (OSH) Act was passed in 1970.  The OSH Act protects all workers from health and 
safety related issues in their working environments.  Protecting workers from injuries is 
important on a social level (Montero, Araque, & Rey, 2009), but there is also a positive 
economic impact in reducing safety hazards (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
2003).  To increase awareness of safety, organizations are looking for a way to monitor the 
good, the bad, and the ugly of their safety culture.  That is, organizations need a tool that 
systematically illustrates what supports safety within their safety culture and what should be 
improved. 
Recent reviews of safety culture measures have revealed a host of potential factors 
which could make up a safety culture (Flin, Mearns, O‟Connor, & Bryden, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000).  However, there is still little consensus regarding what the core factors 
of safety culture are.  The purpose of the current research was to determine the core factors, 
as well as the structure of those factors that make up a safety culture, and establish which 
factors add meaningful value by factor analyzing a safety culture survey.   
Safety Culture Background 
According to a 2006 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, organizations in the 
United States lose up to 170 billion dollars annually due to work-related injuries and unsafe 
working environments (as cited in Towers Watson, 2010).  The National Safety Council‟s 
(NSC) most recent statistics show annual losses can be as high as 183 billion dollars 
(National Safety Council, 2010).  The NSC additionally reported each worker must increase 
his or her productivity on average $1,250 to make up for a single injured worker.  
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Takala (2002) gave a report at the sixteenth World Congress on Safety and Health at 
Work, where he presented economic and competitive disadvantages organizations sustain as 
a result of lost work time due to injury or disease.  Takala reported that the shareholder price 
was higher for organizations that have an effective safety and health management system.  
He also described how the competitive advantage for a country was inversely related to the 
number of per capita fatal accidents within that country.  
Injuries and the associated costs decrease over time when an organization views 
safety as an investment rather than an expense (OSHA, 2003).  A small near-term investment 
in safety programs- can potentially prevent large, future costs due to a disaster.  These costs 
could include workers compensation, lost-time work, or substantial legal costs.  Additionally, 
public reputations could be damaged if the incident was significant, and thus the possibility 
to hurt a company in the marketplace (Myers, 2010).  In attempts to reduce injuries, and 
costs, organizations could attempt to develop a positive safety culture. Behm, Viltri, and 
Kleinsorge (2004) argue that safety cultures, which include prevention and detection 
programs, can increase employee awareness, while reducing costs associated with injuries. 
Organizations are now investing more time and resources into the protection of their 
employees.  This has not always been the case, as workplace safety has been historically 
neglected by organizations to enhance profitability.  Safety concerns have increased after a 
series of disastrous events in the early 1900s through the present (e.g. Hawks Nest tunnel, 
Harshbarger, 2009; Stalnaker, 2006; Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire, von Drehle, 2003).  
These large-scale incidents have decreased over time, but even with increased attention, these 
organizational disasters are still evident today. 
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There was a great deal of discourse around the concept of “safety culture,” following 
a series of mining incidents in 2010.  The Upper Big Branch Mine in West Virginia had 
previously been cited for numerous safety violations (Maher, Powers, & Hughes, 2010).  In 
April 2010, a methane buildup resulted in an explosion and mine collapse.  In the following 
days, there was speculation surrounding the safety culture of workers, as well as those who 
held leadership positions at this mine.  Even when supervisors assured employees working 
conditions were safe, the miners knew their safety equipment (e.g., the methane detectors and 
ventilation systems) did not consistently operate (Berkes & Langfitt, 2010).  Miners observed 
engineers rewiring methane detector equipment under management supervision so employees 
could continue to work in these unsafe environments for the purpose of increasing 
productivity (Christopher, 2010).  This eventually led to a destructive situation that lead to 
injuries, deaths, and a large financial burden.  
Allowing employees to work without following safety protocol creates a negative 
organizational safety culture.  If cultures such as the Upper Big Branch Mine are sustained 
for an extended period, disasters are almost inevitable (Agnew & Daniels, 2010).  On the 
other hand, a positive safety culture can help prevent work-related injuries, including major 
disasters similar to what occurred at the Upper Big Branch Mine.  
Geller and colleagues (Geller, 2005; Hickman & Geller, 2003; Ludwig & Geller, 
2000) have empirically examined what entails a positive safety culture.  According to Geller 
(2001a), a positive safety culture encompasses a purposeful relationship between 
management and employees to improve the safety of all workers.  This means that an 
organization should have adequate safety procedures and proper equipment for their 
employees.  Additionally, management should consistently communicate the importance of 
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safety. Those who work safely should be rewarded and/or recognized and those who 
participate in unsafe practices should be penalized (Pidgeon, 1991).  
Geller (2001b) proposes thata positive safety culture focuses on preventive measures.  
When an organization attempts to prevent accidents before they occur, this communicates to 
all employees that safety is a priority.  This suggests that organizations should place an 
emphasis on safe practices because it is beneficial to the workers, not merely because it is the 
law.  Sulzer-Azaroff, McCann, and Harris (2001) labeled this type of culture “proactive” 
because the organization places safety as a priority before a negative event occurs or a law is 
established.  
External pressures may force an existing safety culture to adjust (e.g., tragedy, 
conforming to a new law). Sulzer-Azaroff et al. (2001) labeled this particular culture 
“reactive” because the organization adjusts their policies after an event has occurred.  
However, if employees are not motivated to act safely, most policies will not increase safe 
behaviors on a large scale (Geller, 2001a).  Instead, Geller (1994) advocates that employee 
motivation for safety should come from participation in the safety program, not a 
bureaucratic process or regulatory policy.   
Safety culture is just one of many subcultures of an overall organizational culture.  A 
positive safety culture should be developed within the framework of an organizational culture 
to help ensure organizational consistency within safety culture programs (Clarke, 1998).  
Before continuing with a safety culture literature review, it is necessary to understand what 
organizational culture is in a broader context, and why researchers continue to focus on it. 
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Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture comes from the external environment and the integration of an 
internal framework (Schein, 1990).  There are varying definitions of organizational culture.  
Organizational culture encompasses the central beliefs, values, and assumptions of the 
organization (Denison, 1996). Alternatively, a more frank definition of organizational culture 
is, “the way we do things around here.”  Schein‟s (1990) commonly held definition of culture 
is:  
[A] pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group, as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore is to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems (p. 111).    
Schein‟s definition should be referred to when organizational culture is referred to in the 
current study. 
Most organizations have mission statements, which should be a reference for 
appropriate conduct for employees.  Cultural assumptions and values are typically the basis 
of an organization‟s mission.  Yet, this is not always the case.  For example, the mission 
statement for Massey Energy Company, which owned and operated the Upper Big Branch 
Mine, is currently:  
Customers: To supply our customers with the highest quality coals at reasonable and 
competitive prices. 
Shareholders: To earn optimal rates of return on the capital used in our business. 
Employees: To provide for the best possible well-being of members. 
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Communities: To be responsible citizens and responsive to the needs of our 
environment. (http://www.masseyenergyco.com).  
Preliminary evidence from the investigation into the mine disaster suggests that these 
principles stated in the company‟s mission were not applied consistently at the Upper Big 
Branch Mine (Berkes & Langfitt, 2010; Christopher, 2010).  Obviously, the organization‟s 
mission and values cannot create or change a culture alone.  Supplementary intervention 
directed at the individual level may be necessary (Redmon & Mason, 2001). 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) suggest that stronger cultures can affect the bottom line 
and productivity of an organization in three ways.  When goals of management and 
employees are united, each understands why their work is vital and necessary to the 
organization.  Thus, strong communication, both from management to employees and vice 
versa, is vital.  Secondly, the motivation of employees, recently referred to as “engagement” 
(Bakker & Schaufeli, 2008), can favorably impact business outcomes (Harter, Schmidt, & 
Hayes, 2002).  Lastly, strong cultures enhance performance by supplying structure and 
control without the need of an overbearing establishment of rules and other formalities.  
These components can contribute to additional organizational profitability within a positive 
safety culture by reducing injuries and the related costs. 
Employee surveys are used to examine organizational culture.  In a recent review, 
Jung et al. (2009) identified 70 instruments for measuring organizational culture.  These 
surveys measure employee attitudes and perceptions across different dimensions of the 
culture. Twenty-six major dimensions (e.g. ethics, rewards, development, leadership, goals) 
were identified within those instruments.  Organizations who monitor and effectively 
intervene upon their culture generally improve the work environment for their employees.  In 
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safety, increasing employee perceptions of their safety culture may be associated with similar 
positive benefits in terms of reduced injuries and associated costs.  Likewise, there are 
negative consequences involved in a non-existent or poorly structured safety culture.   
Safety Culture 
Safety culture, like organizational culture, does not have a universal definition.  Lee 
and Harrison (2000) define safety culture as the values, attitudes, beliefs, risk-perceptions, 
and behaviors as they relate to employee safety.  The Health and Safety Executive of the 
United Kingdom defined it as:  
The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation‟s health and safety 
management…  Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterized by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of 
safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures (as cited in Gadd & 
Collins, 2002, p. 2).  
Guldenmund (2000) proposes that safety culture is “[the] aspects of the organizational 
culture which will impact on attitudes and behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk” 
(p. 251).  For the purposes of this research, Guldenmund‟s definition of safety culture, based 
on Schein‟s (1990) organizational culture definition, will be used. 
Safety culture constructs.  Two recent reviews of safety culture investigated 
numerous safety culture surveys, and identified the common constructs measured between 
the surveys (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000).  Based on these and additional research 
reviews conducted in this study, other factors were found that might also represent core 
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factors of safety culture.  A list of potential constructs associated with the measurement of 
safety culture were predicted to be: 
 Management Concern 
 Personal Responsibility  
 Peer Support for Safety 
 Safety Management Systems 
The following sections provide an overview of these constructs.  Some of these core 
constructs contain sub-constructs which will also be discussed leading up to the reasoning 
behind a hierarchical factor analysis to ultimately clarify which factors contribute unique 
variance to safety culture.   
Management concern for safety.  The most prevalent construct identified in every 
survey reviewed was the perception of management/supervisors‟ attitudes and behaviors 
around safety (Flin et al., 2000).  This includes management consideration of employee 
safety, care for employees, and enforcing safety policies and regulations within their 
respective business and industry.  Dollard and Bakker (2010) found evidence that positive 
safety culture values can permeate an organization if top management leads safety efforts by 
communicating and exhibiting the importance of safety.  Branham (2010) suggested 
leadership (management and supervisors) should spend more time on the floor with 
employees, much like football coaches are on the field with their players.   
Level of management.  In many safety culture surveys, it is not clear whether 
employees were reacting to senior executives or their direct supervisors when answering the 
questions about management (Flin et al., 2000).  To clarify this ambiguity, safety culture 
surveys should distinguish between the individual‟s supervisor and senior management.  
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Questions in the current survey do specifically distinguish between senior management and 
supervisors.  Survey questions around management concern for safety ask employees if they 
perceive safety as a primary concern for senior management, if their supervisor gives 
corrective feedback at opportune times, or if their supervisor puts production in front of 
safety.   
Work pressure.  Work pressure typically included the pace of work and the amount of 
workload employees usually faced (Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 1995; Phillips, Cooper, 
Sutherland, & Makin, 1993).  This belongs as a sub-factor of management concern because 
management creates the operation and production schedules.  Management should encourage 
safe behavior along with their operation goals, not in lieu of safety performance.  The two 
should not be viewed as mutually exclusive.  Otherwise, employees view production and 
performance as a higher priority than safety, and unsafe behavior may be reinforced and 
repeated.   
Personal responsibility for safety.  Harvey, Erdos, Bolam, Cox, Kennedy, and 
Gregory (2002) defined personal responsibility as the “perceived responsibility for 
involvement in safety issues” (p. 23).  Harvey et al. found that workers tend to feel less 
responsibility than managers/supervisors.  Perhaps because of this, Guldenmund (2000) gave 
little attention to the construct.  However, personal responsibility does appear in surveys by 
Cox and Cox (1991) and Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams (1995).  Personal responsibility means 
workers are accountable for their own safety, and management is accountable for reducing 
their workers‟ risky behavior, as is part of their job description.   
An aspect of personal responsibility that has gained a lot of attention in the literature 
is risk taking.  Risk is possibly the broadest of the constructs assessed through many 
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measures such as self-reports of risk taking (Alexander, Cox, & Cheyne, 1995; Lee, 1998; 
Mearns, Flin, Fleming, & Gordon, 1997; Phillips et al., 1993), perception of risk (Brown & 
Holmes, 1986), and attitudes toward levels of risk taking (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; Janssens et 
al., 1995; Zohar, 1980).  In theory, if organizations work to reduce worker risk taking, this in 
turn should reduce unsafe practices.  The current study assessed risk taking within the 
personal responsibility factor (e.g., “I tend to work more risky when supervisors are not 
present”).  Survey questions around personal responsibility for safety would ask employees if 
they bypass safe procedures for means of increasing, production or if they report minor 
injuries.   
Peer support for safety.  Outside of measures of management concern, a “caring” 
factor was not found within any survey reviewed by Flin et al. (2000) or Guldenmund 
(2000).  However, co-workers are constantly around each other while completing job tasks 
(some of which may be dangerous and hazardous).  Therefore, a construct of employee 
caring seems to be an important safety culture construct related to moment-to-moment safety 
behaviors. 
There is a robust model of employee-focused caring in safety culture literature.  For 
over two decades, Geller (1991, 1994, 2001a, 2001b) has been advocating an Actively 
Caring factor as an essential part of safety culture.  Geller (1991) originally coined the term, 
Actively Caring, as “employees acting to optimize the safety of other employees” (p. 607).  
Geller (2001b) suggests Actively Caring occurs when employees go out of their way to alert 
a co-worker who is exhibiting at-risk behavior or congratulating employees for performing 
their task safely.  He described Actively Caring as positive behaviors that lead to a safer 
working environment through selection by consequences (2001b).  That is, safe behavior is 
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reinforced through positive consequences (e.g., a caring social interaction) that occur after a 
particular action (Skinner, 1981).  
In addition to the workers receiving feedback on their safe behaviors, workers who 
give feedback are also reinforced for “optimiz[ing] the safety of other employees” (Geller, 
1991, p. 607).  Actively Caring is further discussed in Roberts and Geller (1995) and Geller 
(1991, 1994, 2001a, 2001b).  Throughout the rest of this study, Actively Caring will be 
referenced as peer support for safety.  Survey questions around peer support for safety ask 
employees if they should caution each other about hazardous work, do caution each other, 
and respectfully acknowledge each other when they witness a particularly safe behavior.   
Safety management system (SMS).  “Safety systems” was another construct 
appearing in the Flin et al. (2000) review.  Safety systems include the processes managers in 
organizations use to control safety.  These methods include actions such as designating safety 
officials (Phillips et al., 1993; Zohar, 1980), creating safety committees (Ostrom, 
Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993; Zohar, 1980), enacting policies (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997), or 
developing prevention strategies (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997).  Hahn and Murphy (2008) also 
argued that perceived worker involvement in safety programs and safety feedback should be 
included in definitions of safety systems. 
Despite the prevalence of the construct in the literature, safety systems were not 
consistently defined in the previous reviews (Flin et al., 2000; Guldnemund, 2000).  Nor 
were the components measured reliably in past surveys (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, & 
Vázquez-Ordás, 2007; Hale, 2003; Hale, Heming, Carthey, & Kirwan, 1997).  Thus, a more 
refined concept of SMS offers a consistent definition and assessment (Fernández-Muñiz et 
al., 2007; Hale, 2003).  While Flin et al. (2000) went as far to say SMS may not be necessary 
HIERARCHICAL ANALYSIS OF A SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY 14 
 
when assessing safety culture, others have demonstrated SMS scales can improve the 
measurement of an overall safety culture if the SMS is well-organized and defined (Bottani, 
Monica, & Vignali, 2009; Cooper & Phillips, 2004).  
Fernández-Muñiz et al. (2007) significantly expanded this construct in recent years, 
suggesting an effective SMS should contain six important aspects: safety policy, incentives 
for employee participation, training, communication, planning, and control.  Fernández-
Muñiz et al. included a separate factor of employee involvement.  However, their study still 
did not include all core constructs of an SMS or safety culture as described by the current 
study.  According to the current research, all of these factors could be regarded as sub-factors 
in a SMS: 
 Safety Policy, Procedures, and Rules 
 Training  
 Communication 
 Incident Reporting and Analysis 
 Safety Audits and Inspections 
 Rewards and Recognition 
 Employee Engagement 
 Safety Meetings/Committees 
 Suggestions/Concerns 
 Discipline  
Safety policy, procedures and rules.  Guldenmund (2000) found procedures/rules to 
be a prominent factor in the studies reviewed (Lee, 1998; Mearns et al., 1997; Ostrom et al., 
1993).  This construct is defined by employee perceptions of the frequency which they 
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comply or violate rules and procedures.  Although Flin et al. (2000) suggested this construct 
is related to risk taking because risk involves breaking rules and not following safety policy, 
the majority of studies suggested categorizing it under SMS (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007; 
Hale, 2003).  
Training. In this research, training was defined as a program that includes all 
necessary safety information, adequate practice, and consistency.  In a more recent meta-
analysis, Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke (2009) found that selecting and training safe 
workers can increase dispositional factors related to safety culture (e.g. safety knowledge, 
safety motivation).  This, in turn, can aid in decreasing the number of accidents and injuries 
within the workforce.  Safety specific training also demonstrates the company places a 
priority on safe work practices (Christian et al., 2009).   
Communication.  Hale, Guldenmund, van Loenhout, and Oh (2010) emphasize that 
components of the SMS need to be consistently communicated and applied from top 
management and safety professionals.  Top-down communication is necessary to show mid-
management and frontline workers that a proper safety initiative is vital for organizational 
success (Dollard & Bakker, 2010). Examples of communication found in the current research 
include regular communication of safety goals from management to employees and certainty 
that incident reports are regularly reviewed and shared with employees. 
Incident reporting and analysis.  The findings of Nielsen, Carstensen, and Rasmussen 
(2006) suggest reporting minor injuries and near-misses are associated with decreased long-
term injuries.  Computer-based or traditional paper-based reporting procedures can be used to 
track these reports.  Nielsen et al. advocate that employees should not only report minor or 
near incidents, but they should also have an opportunity to offer suggestions for future 
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preventive measures.  Incident reporting and analysis may also be related to both 
management concern and employee involvement; however, most suggest it is primarily a 
SMS factor (Nielsen et al.).  
Safety audits and inspections.  Kunreuther, McNulty, and Kang, (2002) emphasize 
the importance of proper inspections and audits in a safety management plan.  This element 
of an SMS can be particularly costly, so Kunreuther et al. suggest using a third party to 
coordinate inspections instead of hiring or using current employees who may have biases.  
Branham (2010) calls audits “forced compliance,” but in the current study audits and 
inspections consist of offering regular safety feedback from inspections, and prioritizing 
hazards according to potential for injury. 
Rewards and recognition.  Rewards and recognition are important for safety 
management systems if they adequately reinforce safe behavior while punishing at-risk 
behavior (Hsu, Lee, Wu, & Takano, 2008; Pidgeon, 1991).  Rewards and recognition were 
defined as a fair incentive and feedback system that encourages employees to work safely.  A 
fair system includes not rewarding employees who fail to work in accordance with safe 
procedures (Hsu et al., 2008).  An example of rewards and recognition comprises of 
employees who work safe then benefit from better performance reviews, and those who are 
not safe do not get the same recognition.  Another example is the celebration of safety 
achievements in work units.  However, the recognition of safety milestones is only 
productive if it does not inhibit incident reporting.  Geller (2000) suggests celebrating 
milestones such as a specific number of incident reports or safety audits. 
Employee engagement.  Dollard and Bakker (2010) suggest that employee 
engagement in safety at work can lead to positive organizational outcomes, such as fewer 
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work-related injuries, if employees have adequate resources.  It is empowering for employees 
to be involved in their work processes and associated safety processes (Hsu et al., 2008).  
Branham (2010) suggests a workforce is engaged when individuals promote safe behaviors 
and actively reduce workplace hazards.  Interestingly, safety culture is more correlated with 
worker engagement than worker compliance with rules and procedures (Christian et al., 
2009).  As such, Podgórski (2006) suggests that a good SMS has a mechanism for employee 
engagement.  Survey questions around engagement would include asking employees if they 
correct safety hazards without being told, even if it temporarily prohibits production.   
Safety meetings/committees. Hale et al. (2010) stress the importance of having a 
vehicle whereby workers and management can discuss and solve safety issues.  Christian et 
al. (2009) suggest one way safety information can be communicated is formally through 
meetings.  This can be achieved through open employee participation or through 
representatives voted on by employees (Podgórski, 2006).  Washington State requires all 
large organizations to construct safety committees under certain conditions and suggests 
smaller operations conduct regular safety meetings (Washington State Department of Labor 
and Industries, 2009).  Within these regulations, safety meetings/committees were required to 
be held monthly, and a manager representative was required to be present.  Examples of 
topics discussed in these meetings included reviewing safety/health inspection reports to 
correct safety hazards, evaluating accident investigations conducted to determine if the 
causes of the safety hazard were identified and corrected, evaluating workplace accident and 
illness prevention program and discussing suggestions for improvement.  These guidelines 
around safety meetings are constructive for the successful implementation of a positive safety 
culture (Podgórski, 2006) and should be assessed in safety culture assessments.  
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Suggestions/concerns.  An additional way employees can express safety issues and 
concerns is a mechanism for employee suggestions.  This construct was defined as 
employees offering appropriate suggestions, and supervisors acting swiftly and appropriately 
in the response.  Tharaldsen, Mearns, and Knudsen (2010) suggest a system for employees to 
recommend improvements in safety procedures to managers (bottom-up communication).  
However, suggestions need to be taken seriously, or else employees could view the process 
as a joke (McAdam, 2011).  Some organizations that have saved money due to employee 
suggestions offer a monetary award to the employee who made the recommendation 
(McAdam, 2011).  
Discipline.  Disciplinary actions should be consistent, fair, and appropriate when at-
risk behaviors are found whether an injury occurs or not.  Branham (2010) suggests it is best 
to avoid discipline when an alternate learning opportunity is available, because discipline 
never immediately follows the unsafe behavior.  Further, he suggests discipline should be 
used constructively to encourage workers, not merely to discourage particular behaviors.  
Survey question examples may include asking if employees are disciplined when they should 
be and if discipline for violations is fair and consistent.  
Summary of safety culture survey constructs.  Some constructs reviewed above have 
never been included in a published survey of safety culture but have potential to offer 
meaningful value to safety culture measurement. The most common factor in any review 
involved management concern, so this was included in the current research as management 
concern for safety.  A personal responsibility factor was sparse in the literature review.  
However, employees should be responsible for their own safety and amount of risk taking 
within their organization (Harvey et al., 2002).  Therefore, a second factor to be included was 
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personal responsibility for safety.  Actively Caring has not received any attention in surveys 
but has been argued for (Geller, 2001a); so in this study Actively Caring was included as 
peer support for safety.  Finally, SMS has not been included in a safety culture survey as 
extensively as the above review suggests it should.  Thus, this study suggested several 
constructs that should be included as sub-factors of a safety management system. 
Safety Culture Survey and Factors 
Safety culture, like organizational culture, is measured by surveying employee 
attitudes and perceptions of the organization, its management, and their own actions 
regarding safety.  There have been numerous attempts at developing safety culture surveys.  
Guldenmund (2000, pp. 230-234) and Flin et al. (2000, pp. 181-184) have each presented 
extensive tables which facilitate the understanding of many surveys and the aforementioned 
constructs.  Flin et al. focused on common constructs of safety culture surveys while 
Guldenmund primarily reviewed the many theories and models of safety cultures.  Each 
provided detailed information about the surveys (e.g. number of questions, factors 
measured).  However, it is difficult to find a single survey that exhibited any predictive 
quality in actual safety performance or statistics.  Surveys should reflect predictive qualities 
if they are to be useful.  Nevertheless, until a full meta-analysis is conducted, what accurately 
predicts a good safety culture is not easily discerned (Flin et al. 2000).    
The safety culture factor analysis in this study aims to clarify core factors that should 
be included in safety culture measurements but have not been reviewed thoroughly in the 
survey literature.  The individual factors included in the factor analysis were chosen because 
they appeared in a majority of safety culture surveys as reviewed by Flin et al. (2000) or 
Guldenmund (2000).  However, gaps seemed to be prevalent in previous safety culture 
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survey literature.  One gap was peer support for safety, which was left out entirely, and the 
other was safety management systems, which appeared in the literature but was expanded in 
this study.  Therefore, these new and expanded factors were also investigated. 
 “Safety Culture” was indicated by four related but distinct constructs: management 
concern, personal responsibility for safety, peer support for safety, and safety management 
systems with a number of sub-factors according to the previous review.  Therefore, Safety 
Culture was a higher-order latent variable that shaped these characteristics, as shown in 
Figure 1.  Moreover, sub-factors may be safety culture variables that were likely to be highly 
correlated, which would be consistent with Edwards and Bagozzi (2000).  Based on the 
literature review, Figure 1 presents potential major constructs that should be included in a 
survey measuring safety culture. 
The factor structure was considered as a reflective construct with effects indicators 
flowing from the construct to the individual factors (see Figure 1) rather than a formative 
construct.  Simply stated, the safety culture causes the items of the survey to reflect the 
changes in the overall construct.  This is the typical structure when considering the 
development of a survey. 
This study further investigated the safety culture construct through both an 
exploratory and hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis.  An exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted to determine which questions contributed meaningful value to the model.  A 
hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to validate the results of the 
exploratory analysis and to determine the hierarchical structure proposed by the current 
model.  There were two hypotheses.  We expected the proposed core factors, as well as the 
structure of those factors above, to represent a more complete safety culture as compared to 
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previous surveys in the literature.  The second was that the survey items would be reduced to 
those that add meaningful statistical value to the safety culture survey. 
Method 
Participants 
This survey was administered by means of online and paper formats to 25,574 
employees across five multinational companies representing five different industries.  The 
industries represented included mining, chemical, healthcare, steel, agricultural.  Countries 
representing all contents with the exception of Antarctica were included in this study.  This 
study was approved by Appalachian State University‟s Institutional Review Board (#11-
0189, see Appendix A).  
Survey Development 
Seven Subject Matter Experts (SME) in safety culture with extensive professional 
experience as safety consultants were used for question development.  Each SME held a 
graduate (masters or doctoral level) degree in industrial/organizational psychology, industrial 
engineering, human factors engineering/ergonomics, organizational design and development, 
occupational safety and health, communications, and/or education/training. 
The Q-Sort method (Van Exel & de Graff, 2005) is the technique used to construct 
questions of a safety culture survey.  First, an analysis of the reviewed literature was 
evaluated by the SME.  Then, each SME prioritized the constructs, which revealed the 
importance of each construct.  Next, each prioritized list was examined to show which 
constructs were most important in contributing to a safety culture survey according to all of 
the SME judgments.  Once the factors were constructed, a set of questions was created for 
each factor.  These questions underwent various stages of sorting between the SME to 
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determine what was necessary in measuring a safety culture construct and what was 
irrelevant or redundant.  Once a consensus was made, the questions were assembled into a 
survey.  
The SMEs developed 92 questions (see Appendix B) which are tentatively organized 
into four broad scales:  a) management concern for safety (16 questions), b) peer support for 
safety (10 questions), c) personal responsibility for safety (7 questions), and d) safety 
management systems (54 questions).  There were numerous questions that overlapped 
between scales, along with five questions that did not reliably fall into a potential scale but 
were considered important enough to keep in the survey.  There were 12 items that were 
reverse-scored because the meaning of the questions were the opposite direction of the scale 
(i.e., high-rated items were considered negative responses, and low-rated items were 
considered positive responses).  Lastly, all items were rated on the same 5-point Likert scale 
(e.g., “Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Neutral – Agree – Strongly Agree”). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset consisted of 25,574 participants from five multinational organizations 
within five different industries.  Appendix B presents the means, medians, standard 
deviations, variances, skewness, standard error of the skewness, kurtosis, and standard error 
of kurtosis for each item in the survey.  Although most items were negatively skewed, 
normality is not an assumption of factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The overall 
reliability estimate (Cronbach's alpha) for the survey was α = .95.   
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Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
After initial descriptive analyses were conducted, the 92-item measure was subjected 
to an EFA to assess the number of safety culture factors using approximately half of the 
study‟s participants, 12,709 workers (Cudeck & Browne, 1983).  This selection procedure 
was completed at random.  The EFA was performed using SPSS for Windows, Release 
Version 18.0, (SPSS, Inc., 2009).  The EFA used principal component analysis as an 
extraction method with direct oblimin rotation (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 
1999) on the randomly selected first half of the data set (Cudeck & Browne, 1983). 
To determine the maximum number of factors that should be interpreted, the Kaiser 
rule was utilized (Fabrigar et al., 1999).  Therefore, all factors with an eigenvalue above 1.0 
were held for the hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis.  The results can be found in Table 
1.  Originally, the results indicated that 13 factors should be retained for interpretation.  
However, the original fifth factor held three items, two of which were Heywood cases (i.e., 
correlations over 1 or below negative 1) and the other was a cross-loaded item.  
Consequently, this factor was removed from the analyses.  Table 1 also indicates over 50% 
of the safety culture model can be explained by these 12 factors. 
The resultant names of the resultant 12 factors are presented in Table 2 and the factor 
loadings are presented in Table 3.  (Note that the item numbers shown in Table 3 correspond 
to the items written in full in Appendix B.)  The theoretical factors of management concern, 
personal responsibility for safety, peer support for safety, and safety management systems are 
reflected relatively evenly throughout the 12 factors.  Factors 3 and 12 were indicated only 
by reverse-scored items, an occasional problem noted in past EFA research by Fabrigar et al. 
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(1999) and Hinkin (1995), but both rationally contributed to the model.  Therefore, they were 
not discarded. 
Using Tabachnick and Fidell‟s (2007) recommendation of .33 as a minimum cutoff 
for a factor loading, 13 items were removed for insufficiently loading on any factor.  Another 
four items were removed for cross-loading on multiple factors or because they were 
Heywood cases, as mentioned previously.  Finally, three items were dropped because there 
was no rational basis to include them on the factors in which they loaded.   
At the conclusion of this process, 72 items were retained representing the 
aforementioned 12 factors.  This set of 72 items demonstrated good reliability (α = .93).  
Correlations among the four sub-factors of safety culture including management concern for 
safety, personal responsibility for safety, peer support for safety, and safety management 
systems were significant and strong (see Table 4).  As expected, there were higher 
correlations between dimensions representing conceptually similar dimensions (i.e., 
management concern for safety, peer support for safety, and safety management systems).  
Also expected was an artifactual reverse-scoring issue that arose with the personal 
responsibility for safety factor, which decreased both the correlations with the other factors 
as well as internal reliability of the personal responsibility factor consistent with Harvey et 
al., (1985).  Generally, though, reliability estimates were high for each of the four sub-factors 
of safety culture: α = 0.88 for management concern for safety, α = 0.68 for personal 
responsibility for safety, α = 0.84 for peer support for safety, and α = 0.94 for safety 
management systems.  These factors were then tested using a hierarchical factor structure 
procedure to determine the accuracy of the presented model. 
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Hierarchical Confirmatory Factor analysis (HCFA) 
After the exploratory analysis was completed, the other half of the randomly selected 
participants, 12,865 respondents, was examined using HCFA using Mplus 4.21 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2002).  This was conducted to determine if the conclusions of the EFA were 
reliable.   
A HCFA was conducted to cross-validate the four-factor structure that emerged from 
the literature review.  MPLUS 4.21 (Muthén & Muthén, 2002) was employed to confirm the 
hypothesized model and the results of the EFA.  The safety culture model was a hierarchical 
model in which the superordinate safety culture construct affects the four first-order 
constructs.   
Before conducting the analyses, it was necessary to parcel the items within the factors 
consistent with Hall, Snell, and Foust (1999).  The items constituting each extracted factor 
were parceled as unidimensional indicators.  The range of items on the parcels varied from 
two to nine items depending on the factor.  Each parcel was combined because of theoretical 
reasons, and to account for the artifactual reverse-scored items, which fell on two factors.  
This procedure allowed the HCFA to reveal the nature of the model better than the individual 
items could because it reduced secondary factor contamination.  The rationale used to parcel 
items was consistent with the recommendations made by Hall et al. (1999).   
After the parceling procedure was conducted, the hierarchical model was then 
specified to estimate each of the loadings on the four second-order factors and the 12 
parceled indicators.  There was a strong positive correlation (r = .47, p < .001) between 
indicators 3 and 12, the two artifactual reverse-scored indicators, so this was specified to 
further identify the model.  
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The hierarchical model from the literature view was confirmed through HCFA.  Table 
5 demonstrates the model produces good fit.  A comparative fit index (CFI), which was 
expected to be close to 0.95 or greater (Hu & Bentler, 1999), was CFI = 0.95.  A root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA), which was expected to be close to 0.06 or lower 
(Hu & Bentler), was RMSEA = 0.08.  A standardized-root-mean-square residual (SRMR), 
which was expected to be close to 0.08 or lower (Hu & Bentler), was SRMR = 0.04.  The 
chi-square difference test is hypersensitive to very large or small sample sizes, and can 
falsely indicate poor model fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Consequently, because the 
sample size in this study was very large, it was not considered as a fit index in the analysis.  
Consistent with Kline (2005), the fit indices indicate a good fit to the data.  There was a 
strong theoretical reason to expect a hierarchical structure.  Therefore, these results were 
supportive of the theoretical model.  Figure 2 shows the results of this model with all factor-
loading coefficients.  Further, Table 6 shows the factors, which the SME thought each item 
should originate, and where each item was placed after the empirical analyses. 
Discussion 
The literature review of safety culture constructs and measurement determined that 
not all constructs that frame a safety culture had been included in safety culture surveys.  
Namely, factors of personal responsibility for safety and safety management systems had not 
been thoroughly examined in safety culture measurements, while peer support for safety had 
not been examined in any reviewed survey.  Thus, the purpose of this study was to determine 
a complete set of core factors for measuring a safety culture and to reduce the survey to a 
rational set of items that contributes meaningful variance to the measurement of safety 
culture.   
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The results presented empirical support for the proposed model.  This evidence 
indicated that the factor structure of the safety culture survey was empirically validated after 
the initial expert (SME) survey development process.  Therefore, this measure already 
exhibited content validity measuring all core areas reviewed in the literature (Flin et al., 
2000; Geller, 2001a; Guldenmund, 2000).  Figure 2 shows the core factors extracted from 
this study and demonstrates the hierarchical structure determined by the HCFA. 
The Model 
The theoretical model from the literature review was confirmed, with some 
exceptions.  First, not all reviewed factors were extracted in the initial EFA.  Second, two of 
the sub-factors, personal responsibility for safety and peer support for safety, were 
determined to have a more complicated hierarchical factor structure according to the HCFA 
than was originally hypothesized.  Conversely, the SMS factor was determined to be less 
complicated than hypothesized.  However, because the factor loadings were so robust (see 
Figure 2), it is reasonable to assume that the overall model was supported, and safety culture 
consists of the aforementioned factors. 
The overall model indicated good fit (see Table 5).  The CFI and the SRMR fell 
within range of good fit as indicated by Hu and Bentler (1999).  The RMSEA fell within the 
close or acceptable range as indicated by Hu and Bentler (1999) and Fan and Sivo (2007).  
Additionally, 50% of the variance of a safety culture is explained in this model (see Table 2). 
The safety model presented in Figure 2 illustrates safety culture as a second-order 
latent variable, and management concern for safety, personal responsibility for safety, peer 
support for safety, and safety management systems as first-order sub-factors, as identified by 
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12 parceled indicators.  The following is a summary of the factors extracted through the two 
analyses. 
First, management concern for safety was determined to be consistent with the 
literature review (Flin et al., 2000).  The review suggested safety culture surveys should 
distinguish between different levels of management.  The EFA extracted separate “supervisor 
concern” and “senior management concern” factors, and the HCFA confirmed they should be 
sub-factors of management concern for safety.  A third factor of “work pressure” was 
proposed to fall under management concern because supervisors and management control 
production and operation schedules.  This factor was also extracted from the EFA and 
confirmed by the HCFA. 
Second, personal responsibility for safety was determined to have three sub-factors.  
This is not what the hypothesized model proposed, but the factors fell rationally under the 
personal responsibility factor nonetheless.  In the review, risk taking was the main factor of 
personal responsibility, and this was confirmed in the HCFA.  Risk taking was one of the two 
reverse coded parcel factors.  Therefore, there was a negative, although still strong, factor-
loading.  The other reverse coded factor was “supervisor and management blame.”  This was 
not reviewed as a separate factor under personal responsibility, but it is rational to put it 
under this responsibility factor.  If supervisors and management blame the employee before 
an investigation or without looking at the overall situation, this is unconstructive and not a 
responsible way to supervise employees.  This factor did not fall under the management 
concern, or safety management systems factor because of the wording of the items.  Once 
again, there was a strong negative factor-loading as shown in Figure 2.  The third factor was 
“incident reporting.”  This factor was reviewed under SMS, but the factor extracted in the 
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EFA was most reasonably included under personal responsibility because it assesses the 
frequency of reporting incidents and near misses.  It is the employees‟ responsibility to report 
incidents when they should.  
Peer support for safety was not hypothesized to include sub-factors.  However, two 
related but distinct, peer support factors were extracted from the EFA.  The two factors are 
“cautioning others” and “respectful feedback.”  Each of these factors is rationally included 
under peer support for safety, and this was confirmed by the HCFA.  “Cautioning others” 
assesses whether workers will intentionally disrupt their production to assist a co-worker 
working at risk.  “Respectful feedback” assesses whether they offer feedback to others and 
do so respectfully. 
Lastly, safety management systems was determined to be much less complex than the 
literature review suggested.  Instead of the hypothesized 10 factors, four were extracted from 
the EFA and then confirmed by the HCFA.  The four factors were “communication,” 
“training and rules,” “discipline and investigation,” and “rewards and recognition.”  
“Training and rules” were combined in a factor extracted from the EFA, and this is 
reasonable because workers can learn the safety rules through training (Christian et al., 
2009).  The EFA did not extract any factors of safety audits and inspections, employee 
engagement, safety meetings/committees, or suggestions/concerns.  Additionally, the 
“incident report” factor fell under personal responsibility better than safety management 
systems because the individual is responsible for reporting his or her own incidents.  
Otherwise, “communication,” “discipline and investigation,” and “rewards and recognition” 
are rationally included under SMS as the literature review suggested.   
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Overall, this model is very consistent with the constructs and factors listed in the 
literature review (Flin et al., 2000; Geller, 2001a; Guldenmund, 2000).  Some were expanded 
and others were removed, but the HCFA confirmed the rationality of the overall model.  The 
survey, based on the model, accurately assessed safety culture according to these results.  
Thus, the proposed model addressed certain gaps in the literature, and statistical analyses 
confirmed the rationale behind the model. 
Gaps Addressed in Current Model 
This study suggests the four factors of management concern for safety, personal 
responsibility for safety, peer support for safety, and safety management systems.  By 
including all four factors, this study addresses a gap in the literature.  Not all safety culture 
surveys have incorporated the necessary core safety culture factors as proposed by the 
current research.  For example, no surveys previously reviewed incorporated any peer 
support for safety.  Thus, this study expanded on a key gap in the literature by including this 
factor.  Second, a full personal responsibility for safety factor was not thoroughly constructed 
in the literature (Cox & Cox, 1991; Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams 1995; Harvey et al., 2002), 
although risk taking is prominent in many safety culture surveys (Flin et al., 2000).   
Lastly, some have suggested, a systems or SMS factor is not necessary in assessment 
of safety culture (Flin et al., 2000).  However, others confirmed that this factor was not only 
necessary, but an essential part of evaluating safety culture (Fernández-Muñiz et al. 2007; 
Hale, 2003).  Fernández-Muñiz et al. had come closest to fully reviewing the proposed model 
of SMS, but still omitted important components of the construct.  However, the proposed 
model was not entirely confirmed, as “training and rules,” “communication,” “discipline and 
investigation,” and “rewards and recognition” were the only extracted factors found on safety 
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management systems.  As previously suggested, the other factors were not extracted in the 
EFA, or they rationally fell on a separate factor (i.e., personal responsibility for safety).  
Whether the factor fell on a safety management system or personal responsibility for safety 
factor depended on the wording of the items.   
An organization can have a more thorough understanding of their safety culture by 
utilizing a survey, which includes the four core factors as found in the current study.  By 
addressing these gaps, this survey may provide the ability for organizations to better assess 
their safety culture, intervene where necessary, and in doing so, yield important financial 
results. 
Implications  
Once an organization has a systematic understanding of their safety culture, they can 
understand the financial benefits and other business outcomes from safety interventions and 
programs.  For example, management concern is necessary when creating a safety culture, 
but a lack of management involvement can have some negative financial implications.  
Smallman and John (2001) conducted a thorough analysis of senior management in Financial 
Times and Stock Exchange (FTSE) UK index companies and found they all viewed safety as 
a priority.  They collectively agreed that a poor safety record could negatively impact 
stakeholders‟ views of the organization and damage the company financially.  Conversely, it 
was also noted, that an excellent safety record did not always translate to financial success.  
Perhaps, organizations with better safety records are not always enhanced financially, but 
those with poor safety records have little opportunity for stakeholder and investor support.  It 
is possible for organizations to over-invest in safety.  In doing so, they may have an excellent 
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safety record, but their overall profit margins may decrease.  An efficient way to increase 
safety in the workplace is to increase co-worker support. 
Peer support for safety has the most empirical support for financial returns.  When 
Turner, Hershcovis, Chmiel, and Walls (2010) evaluated three levels of organizational 
support (i.e., senior management, supervisors, and co-workers), co-workers were the most 
important for increasing worker safety in hazardous situations.  The study showed that with 
increased co-worker support, there were decreased injuries translating into lower financial 
expenditures for the organization.  If workers constantly monitor each other and offer 
corrective and positive feedback, that supportive behavior can increase the enhancement of a 
safety culture (Geller, 2001a).  However, if an organization does not have the system and 
incentives in place to achieve this culture, the supportive behavior may not be sustained. 
As recommended in the literature review, quality organizational SMS programs are 
necessary for a supportive safety culture.  Financial benefits can be sustained when the SMS 
is consistent with safety and organizational goals.  Accordingly, organizations who 
implement a good SMS show superior business results and performance in safety outcomes 
against companies who do not have a well-organized SMS (Bottani, 2009).  Podgórski 
(2006) also suggests investment in a quality well-implemented SMS should provide the 
organization with financial success.  While a poor system that is not consistent with 
organizational goals may enhance safety performance, it may not necessarily increase 
financial results (Podgórski, 2006). 
One of the more interesting implications is the cumulative effects of the proposed 
model.  Cox, Jones, and Collinson (2006) have demonstrated that trust (i.e., management 
concern for safety), accountability (i.e., personal responsibility for safety), and caring (i.e., 
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peer support for safety) can have an economic benefit to organizations and their stakeholders.  
Their study found that organizations who exhibit high trust could have a substantial increase 
to the bottom line.  Those with a lower level of trust show a negative economic impact on 
their respective businesses.  Thus, when the entire proposed model is implemented efficiently 
and effectively, considerable business outcomes can be achieved.  
Strengths 
This study consisted of some important strengths.  The main strength involved the 
breadth and number participants.  Thousands of workers completed the survey from multiple 
locations of multinational corporations.  These corporations were from five different 
industries and had varying safety records.  Thus, the data were far from a homogenous 
response set and should generalize quite well.  Another strength of this study was how well 
the theorized expert model from the review matched the EFA and HCFA results.  The 
theorized and empirical models are not identical, but the factor loadings confirmed the model 
was quite robust.  However, further research is necessary to demonstrate empirical validation 
of this safety culture survey. 
Future Directions 
The current research confirmed the theoretical model of safety culture, but more 
research should be conducted for further validation of the survey.  Criterion and construct 
validation should be conducted in future studies.  Measurement of safety culture attitudes is 
important, but prediction of safety performance would be ideal.  Therefore, criterion 
validation is one avenue for future research. 
Criterion validity.  Criterion validity assesses the predictive qualities from a measure 
to some outcome or performance (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  Concurrent and predictive 
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validity research could offer validation of this survey.  Concurrent validity could be assessed 
by comparing the overall scores from the measure with current safety performance statistics 
(e.g., minor injuries, near misses, lost workdays).  Predictive validity could be assessed by 
examining the scores from the survey at one point and comparing those scores with the safety 
performance from a future date.  If a predictive link is empirically supported from this safety 
culture survey to safety performance, the value of the measurement will surely increase. 
Although few studies have presented a connection between safety performance 
statistics and culture measurement surveys, Cooper and Phillips (2004) suggest once enough 
data is compiled, a relationship should be noticeable.  However, they do recognize that 
changes in safety culture measures may not lead to improvements in performance and vice 
versa. 
Construct validity.  Construct validity could also be examined in future research.  
Construct validity determines if a measure truly measures the theoretical construct it claims 
to assess (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  This would involve determining convergent and 
discriminant validity.  For convergent validity, the safety culture survey should theoretically 
correlate with other measures of safety culture.  While divergent validity would determine if 
the safety culture survey did not correlate with other measures, such as Scholastic 
Assessment Test (SAT) scores, which it theoretically should not. 
Limitations 
There is potential for new safety culture research to contribute to the literature in a 
wide variety of organizations, and the findings suggest that the safety culture survey is a 
useful tool for future research.  However, this study does have several limitations that need to 
be acknowledged. 
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As with all measurements of safety culture, this survey can only measure the attitudes 
and perceptions of workers about the priority of safety in their organization.  As previously 
mentioned, there is not a consensus on whether measuring safety culture can improve or 
predict actual safety performance (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Glendon & Litherland, 2001).  
Future research could produce this criterion-related validation. 
Another limitation was the 12 artifactual reverse-scored items.  Although it was 
rational to include the factors in the model, the reliability and inter-item correlations 
decreased with the frequency of reverse-scored items as was consistent with Harvey et al. 
(1985).  Nevertheless, the model still exhibited robust results in both factor-loadings and 
overall reliability. 
Alternate models could have also been useful in further determining the structure of 
safety culture.  Specifically, safety culture could simply be a first-order factor with the 12 
parcel indicators reflecting from the factor.  Other models could increase the low reliabilities 
and intercorrelations which were observed in the personal responsibility  factor.  This is 
another possible opportunity for future research. 
Lastly, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested the RMSEA should be .06 or less to be 
indicative of good model fit.  However, the RMSEA was determined to be 0.08 in this study.  
This is still within an acceptable range as poor fit is indicated by an RMSEA of 0.10 or 
higher.  Nonetheless, the other fit statistics robustly reproduced the data, so this was not 
determined to be of great importance. 
Summary and Conclusion 
To conclude, this study attempted to evaluate the core factors of a safety culture, 
including two factors that needed expansion and one factor that seemed to be missing from 
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the measurement literature.  Safety culture was determined to be a higher-order latent 
variable, which consisted of four sub-factors (management concern for safety, personal 
responsibility for safety, peer support for safety, and safety management systems) and 12 
total factors loading on the sub-factors.  The safety culture survey was reduced from 92 to 72 
items, which measure the 12 factors of the higher-order safety culture construct.  Further 
research should examine the predictive ability of the measure for practical use within 
different organizations. 
However, the use of the safety culture survey is not enough to change an unsafe 
culture into a positive safety culture.  Procedural intervention is necessary (Redmon & 
Mason, 2001).  Fortunately, the current measure attempts to assess the mechanisms that 
organizations utilize to implement effective safety interventions (e.g., communication, 
training).  Data presented by McSween (2011) suggests when leadership (senior and/or mid-
level management) participates in the safety process, there are substantial increases in the 
sustainability of the program.  He does note that this cannot simply be communication, but 
leadership must do something in a visible way for the employees to observe.  Further, 
DePasquale and Geller (1999) found that organizations who implemented mandatory 
programs attained more positive organizational results than other organizations who 
implemented voluntary programs.   
The construction of a positive safety culture is not easy, and it is not universal.  
Something that works well in one organization may not work in another.  Adjustments will 
need to be made depending on the resources available and the goals of the different 
organizations.  No matter what an organization does to increase safety, the workforce needs 
to be included in the process beyond simply measuring their attitudes.   
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It is important to emphasize that measuring employee perceptions of safety culture 
does show some commitment to safety, but that cannot be the end of the process.  It is the 
start of an enduring process, which requires that senior management makes safety 
performance a priority in the organization.  The results of the measurement must be 
communicated, and a plan should be implemented to ensure workers that there is precedence 
for safety performance, not just safety culture measurement (Cooper & Phillips, 2004).    
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Appendix B 
Survey Items and Descriptive Statistics 
Items N M Med SD Skew 
SE 
Skewness Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
1. When rules or 
procedures are 
changed, the 
changes are 
promptly 
communicated 
to all affected 
employees.  25242 3.65 4.00 1.11 -0.81 0.02 -0.24 0.03 
2. Senior 
managers invest 
sufficient money 
and resources to 
ensure a safe 
work 
environment.  25220 3.77 4.00 0.97 -0.95 0.02 0.66 0.03 
3. When my 
supervisor 
corrects an 
employee for at-
risk behavior, 
s/he does so 
respectfully.   25150 3.86 4.00 0.96 -1.09 0.02 1.13 0.03 
4. When I see a 
coworker 
working at-risk, 
I caution 
him/her.  25109 4.29 4.00 0.82 -1.72 0.02 4.26 0.03 
5. Employees 
often “short cut” 
safe work 
practices.   25161 2.46 2.00 1.14 0.51 0.02 -0.70 0.03 
6. Employees 
help investigate 
safety incidents.  25156 3.55 4.00 1.05 -0.74 0.02 -0.10 0.03 
7. When I see a 
coworker doing 
something 
especially safe, I 
acknowledge 
him/her. 25191 3.87 4.00 0.91 -0.96 0.02 0.91 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
8. Senior 
managers spend 
time talking one-
on-one with 
employees about 
safety. 25148 3.22 3.00 1.18 -0.32 0.02 -0.91 0.03 
9. Senior 
managers seem 
genuinely 
interested in 
reducing 
injuries. 25161 3.99 4.00 0.97 -1.21 0.02 1.39 0.03 
10. My 
supervisor 
regularly asks 
employees about 
safety concerns 
and ideas to 
improve safety. 25189 3.83 4.00 1.03 -1.01 0.02 0.57 0.03 
11. When an 
employee is 
injured, he or 
she will likely be 
punished 
regardless of the 
causes and 
circumstances.  25158 2.54 2.00 1.17 0.46 0.02 -0.72 0.03 
12. The safety 
committees‟ 
efforts help 
improve safety.    25095 3.72 4.00 0.95 -0.83 0.02 0.56 0.03 
13. The results 
of safety audits 
and inspections 
are regularly 
shared with all 
employees. 25211 3.54 4.00 1.08 -0.68 0.02 -0.35 0.03 
14. The people 
who lead safety 
efforts (e.g., 
safety reps, 
safety managers) 
have enough 
influence and 
staffing to 
adequately 
support safety. 25215 3.49 4.00 1.01 -0.63 0.02 -0.18 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
15. The 
organization‟s 
safety 
improvement 
goals and efforts 
are regularly 
discussed with 
employees.   25222 3.75 4.00 0.93 -0.98 0.02 0.70 0.03 
16. The hiring/ 
promotion 
process selects 
employees with 
the ability and 
motivation to 
work safely. 25209 3.42 4.00 1.10 -0.53 0.02 -0.38 0.03 
17. Safety 
audits/inspection
s are conducted 
regularly in my 
area. 25207 3.86 4.00 0.92 -1.06 0.02 1.11 0.03 
18. People are 
disciplined when 
they should be 
for willful 
serious or 
repeated safety 
violations. 25169 3.75 4.00 0.98 -0.87 0.02 0.49 0.03 
19. Our wellness 
program is 
effective at 
encouraging 
healthy 
behaviors. 25113 3.60 4.00 0.98 -0.69 0.02 0.15 0.03 
20. Standard 
operating 
procedures have 
been developed 
for all critical 
tasks. 25204 3.78 4.00 0.93 -0.97 0.02 0.86 0.03 
21. Some safety 
rules and 
procedures are 
not consistently 
enforced.   25194 2.96 3.00 1.15 -0.03 0.02 -1.08 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
22. Serious 
safety violations 
are treated the 
same whether or 
not an injury 
occurs.  25198 3.53 4.00 1.04 -0.69 0.02 -0.21 0.03 
23. My 
supervisor does 
not put 
production 
ahead of safety.  25198 3.61 4.00 1.16 -0.73 0.02 -0.35 0.03 
24. Employees 
are involved in 
designing the 
safety reward/ 
recognition 
program.  25222 3.06 3.00 1.12 -0.21 0.02 -0.76 0.03 
25. Employees 
are involved in 
conducting 
safety audits and 
inspections. 25209 3.53 4.00 1.05 -0.77 0.02 -0.07 0.03 
26. My 
supervisor 
clearly sets the 
expectation that 
employees must 
follow all safety 
rules and 
procedures. 25207 4.04 4.00 0.89 -1.34 0.02 2.24 0.03 
27. Senior 
managers place 
most of the 
blame for an 
injury on the 
injured 
employee.  25159 2.94 3.00 1.19 0.13 0.02 -0.96 0.03 
28. My 
supervisor often 
gives me 
positive 
feedback when 
s/he sees me 
working safely.  25113 3.53 4.00 1.05 -0.70 0.02 -0.13 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
29. I have 
received 
adequate 
training to be 
able to work 
safely. 25204 4.09 4.00 0.82 -1.36 0.02 2.79 0.03 
30. I am 
comfortable 
raising safety 
concerns to my 
supervisor and 
manager. 25194 4.00 4.00 0.94 -1.31 0.02 1.85 0.03 
31. Senior 
managers fully 
understand the 
real safety issues 
in the 
workplace. 25198 3.53 4.00 1.06 -0.67 0.02 -0.26 0.03 
32Senior 
managers do not 
put production 
ahead of safety. 25198 3.50 4.00 1.11 -0.62 0.02 -0.37 0.03 
33. Senior 
managers are 
more concerned 
about keeping 
the injury 
statistics low 
than with truly 
keeping people 
safe. 25185 2.84 3.00 1.18 0.19 0.02 -0.95 0.03 
34. Senior 
management 
encourages 
preventive 
maintenance 
instead of just 
reacting to 
problems once 
they occur. 25216 3.53 4.00 1.02 -0.72 0.02 -0.05 0.03 
35. Safety rules 
and procedures 
are regularly 
reviewed with 
employees. 25196 3.61 4.00 0.97 -0.80 0.02 0.10 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
36. Safety 
meetings help 
improve safety. 25243 3.98 4.00 0.92 -1.15 0.02 1.37 0.03 
37. Safety 
meetings are 
regularly 
conducted in my 
area. 25208 4.07 4.00 0.89 -1.32 0.02 2.07 0.03 
38. Safety is not 
compromised 
when 
determining  
production 
schedules, 
overtime, and 
staffing. 25223 3.54 4.00 1.06 -0.63 0.02 -0.24 0.03 
39. Safety is 
considered when 
purchasing new 
tools/ 
equipment. 25267 3.77 4.00 0.95 -0.94 0.02 0.86 0.03 
40. Lessons 
learned from 
incidents and 
injuries are 
communicated 
to all relevant 
people. 25085 3.88 4.00 0.93 -1.11 0.02 1.19 0.03 
41. Safety is 
considered when 
changes are 
made to rules 
and procedures. 25137 3.62 4.00 1.01 -0.86 0.02 0.19 0.03 
42. Safety 
incidents that 
happen within 
this workplace 
and elsewhere 
are reviewed 
regularly with 
employees. 25154 3.82 4.00 0.89 -1.06 0.02 1.08 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
43. When 
employees 
correct each 
others‟ at-risk 
behavior, they 
do so 
respectfully.    25162 3.81 4.00 0.85 -1.01 0.02 1.37 0.03 
44. When asked 
to do a new job 
or task, I receive 
enough training 
to be able to do 
it safely. 25144 3.80 4.00 0.92 -1.01 0.02 0.99 0.03 
45. Safety 
hazards found 
during 
inspections are 
followed-up on 
quickly. 25122 3.73 4.00 0.97 -0.92 0.02 0.49 0.03 
46. Safety 
audits/inspection
s are effective in 
identifying and 
correcting safety 
hazards. 25173 3.90 4.00 0.82 -1.07 0.02 1.71 0.03 
47. Our 
company 
recognizes or 
celebrates safety 
achievements or 
milestones. 25243 3.61 4.00 1.09 -0.82 0.02 0.02 0.03 
48. New 
employees 
receive enough 
training before 
doing the job on 
their own. 25208 3.74 4.00 1.01 -0.90 0.02 0.37 0.03 
49. My 
supervisor 
would give me 
corrective 
feedback if s/he 
sees me working 
at-risk.  25223 4.03 4.00 0.82 -1.33 0.02 2.71 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
50. Our training 
program ensures 
all employees 
who do the same 
job learn to do it 
the same way.  25198 3.44 4.00 1.04 -0.59 0.02 -0.38 0.03 
51. Our safety 
reward/recogniti
on program(s) 
encourage 
employees to 
work safely and 
participate in 
safety activities. 25085 3.50 4.00 1.08 -0.61 0.02 -0.31 0.03 
52. Employee 
safety 
suggestions are 
taken seriously. 25137 3.65 4.00 0.99 -0.88 0.02 0.36 0.03 
53. Our safety 
reward/ 
recognition 
program is fair. 25154 3.30 3.00 1.04 -0.46 0.02 -0.30 0.03 
54. Our safety 
audits/ 
inspections 
focus on safe 
work behaviors 
in addition to 
safe work 
conditions. 25162 3.75 4.00 0.88 -1.01 0.02 1.07 0.03 
55. I tend to 
work more risky 
when 
supervisors 
aren‟t present.    25144 2.04 2.00 1.08 1.06 0.02 0.42 0.03 
56. Our 
employee 
assistance 
program helps 
people manage 
personal 
problems which 
may impact 
safety. 25122 3.43 4.00 0.90 -0.53 0.02 0.37 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
57. Employees 
fully understand 
the potential 
hazards of their 
jobs. 25173 3.80 4.00 0.92 -0.96 0.02 0.63 0.03 
58. Employees 
correct safety 
hazards 
themselves when 
appropriate.   25144 3.80 4.00 0.84 -1.15 0.02 1.60 0.03 
59. Employees 
correct safety 
hazards 
themselves when 
appropriate.    25135 3.80 4.00 0.84 -1.15 0.02 1.60 0.03 
60. My 
supervisor 
sometimes 
encourages 
employees to 
overlook hazards 
to get the job 
done.  25180 2.11 2.00 1.13 0.91 0.02 -0.04 0.03 
61. My 
supervisor sets a 
good example 
for safety 
through his/her 
own safe 
behaviors. 25176 3.86 4.00 0.92 -1.12 0.02 1.44 0.03 
62. 
Improvements 
made from 
employee safety 
suggestions are 
communicated 
to all.  25155 3.54 4.00 0.98 -0.70 0.02 -0.15 0.03 
63. My 
supervisor 
quickly 
addresses 
identified 
hazards. 25165 3.83 4.00 0.88 -1.09 0.02 1.41 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
64. Employees 
who actively 
participate in 
safety activities 
are recognized 
for their efforts. 25188 3.30 3.00 1.07 -0.41 0.02 -0.56 0.03 
65. Employees 
receive quick 
responses to 
their safety 
suggestions, 
whether they are 
accepted or not. 25152 3.26 3.00 1.00 -0.42 0.02 -0.47 0.03 
66. In addition 
to working 
safely, most 
employees 
regularly do 
other things to 
improve safety.  25157 3.72 4.00 0.81 -0.91 0.02 1.00 0.03 
67. Minor 
injuries often go 
unreported. 25167 2.85 3.00 1.18 0.12 0.02 -1.04 0.03 
68. Meeting 
production goals 
often requires 
employees to put 
themselves at-
risk.   25088 2.42 2.00 1.15 0.57 0.02 -0.61 0.03 
69. Managers, 
supervisors, and 
employees all 
know what 
behaviors will 
result in 
discipline.  25055 3.69 4.00 0.94 -0.96 0.02 0.67 0.03 
70. Employees 
acknowledge 
each other for 
especially safe 
behaviors. 25076 3.58 4.00 0.92 -0.74 0.02 0.09 0.03 
71. When I have 
a near miss or 
close call, I 
report it. 25112 3.70 4.00 0.99 -0.86 0.02 0.30 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
72. Discipline 
for safety 
violations is fair 
and consistent.   25103 3.30 4.00 1.07 -0.50 0.02 -0.51 0.03 
73. If I have a 
safety 
suggestion or 
concern, I let 
someone know. 25066 4.03 4.00 0.72 -1.37 0.02 3.74 0.03 
74. If I have a 
minor injury, I‟ll 
report it.   25080 3.78 4.00 0.99 -0.96 0.02 0.54 0.03 
75. If a 
coworker saw 
me doing 
something at-
risk, I would 
want them to say 
something to 
me. 25116 4.20 4.00 0.80 -1.52 0.02 3.67 0.03 
76. I use what I 
learn at work to 
improve safety 
at home. 25127 4.11 4.00 0.83 -1.33 0.02 2.63 0.03 
77. I understand 
all rules and 
procedures 
required to 
perform my job 
safely. 25041 4.11 4.00 0.76 -1.33 0.02 3.15 0.03 
78. Employees 
who work safely 
benefit through 
either a better 
performance 
review, chance 
for promotion, 
better job 
assignments, or 
some other 
„perk‟.     25041 3.23 3.00 1.18 -0.36 0.02 -0.79 0.03 
79. I only get 
involved in 
safety activities 
because I‟m 
required to do 
so.   25036 2.33 2.00 1.09 0.74 0.02 -0.18 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
80. I often “short 
cut” safe work 
practices.      25108 1.92 2.00 1.00 1.31 0.02 1.39 0.03 
81. Employees 
should caution 
each other about 
at-risk 
behaviors. 25128 4.20 4.00 0.73 -1.48 0.02 4.37 0.03 
82. Employees 
should 
acknowledge 
each other for 
especially safe 
behaviors. 25146 4.14 4.00 0.74 -1.36 0.02 3.80 0.03 
83. Hazards are 
prioritized and 
corrected based 
on potential for 
injury. 25055 3.71 4.00 0.92 -0.91 0.02 0.72 0.03 
84. Following all 
safety rules and 
procedures 
needlessly slows 
down my job. 25091 2.44 2.00 1.13 0.64 0.02 -0.50 0.03 
85. Everyone is 
held to the same 
safety standard 
(e.g., all 
departments, 
contractors).  25079 3.56 4.00 1.16 -0.71 0.02 -0.40 0.03 
86. Employees 
help establish 
and/or change 
safety rules, 
regulations, 
policies, and/or 
procedures. 25074 3.45 4.00 1.01 -0.66 0.02 -0.17 0.03 
87. All 
incidents, even 
minor ones, are 
thoroughly 
investigated if 
they have 
potential for 
serious injury. 25078 3.80 4.00 0.94 -0.98 0.02 0.84 0.03 
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Items N M Med SD Skew SE Skew Kurtosis 
SE 
Kurtosis 
88. All factors 
(e.g., inadequate 
training, 
production 
pressure, 
excessive 
overtime) are 
adequately 
considered 
during incident 
analyses.  25061 3.48 4.00 1.01 -0.64 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
89. Alcohol or 
drug abuse is a 
problem at my 
site. 25133 2.23 2.00 1.26 0.85 0.02 -0.34 0.03 
90. Employees 
caution each 
other about at-
risk behaviors. 25088 3.49 4.00 1.00 -0.69 0.02 -0.16 0.03 
91. Employees 
are kept 
informed of the 
safety 
committees‟ 
activities.    25126 3.84 4.00 0.82 -1.10 0.02 1.58 0.03 
92. Employees 
appreciate 
feedback from 
coworkers for 
at-risk 
behaviors.  25101 3.78 4.00 0.82 -1.00 0.02 1.27 0.03 
 
Note. N = Total participants; M = Mean; Med = Median; SD = Standard Deviation; Skew = Skewness; 
SE Skew = Standard error of skewness; SE Kurtosis = Standard error of kurtosis.  
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Table 1 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Eigenvalues and Percent of Variance 
 
Factor Eigenvalue 
Variance 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 26.06 28.32 28.32 
2 4.13 4.49 32.81 
3 2.94 3.20 36.01 
4 2.56 2.79 38.80 
5 1.66 1.80 40.60 
6 1.54 1.68 42.28 
7 1.46 1.58 43.86 
8 1.30 1.41 45.27 
9 1.23 1.34 46.61 
10 1.16 1.26 47.87 
11 1.07 1.16 49.03 
12 1.03 1.12 50.15 
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Table 2 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Factor Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Factor  Factor Description 
1 Training and Rules 
2 Peer Support Caution Others 
3 Risk Taking 
4 Peer Support Respectful Feedback 
5 Reward/Recognition 
6 Supervisor Concern 
7 Senior Management Concern 
8 Discipline and Investigation 
9 Incident Reporting 
10 Communication  
11 Senior Management and/or Supervisor Blame  
12 Management Work Pressure  
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Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
48. New employees receive 
enough training before doing the 
job on their own. 
.495                       
50. Our training program ensures 
all employees who do the same 
job learn to do it the same way.  
.479                       
57. Employees fully understand 
the potential hazards of their jobs. 
.465                       
20. Standard operating procedures 
have been developed for all 
critical tasks. 
.445                       
29. I have received adequate 
training to be able to work safely. 
.443                       
44. When asked to do a new job 
or task, I receive enough training 
to be able to do it safely. 
.417                       
36. Safety meetings help improve 
safety. 
.371                       
19. Our wellness program is 
effective at encouraging healthy 
behaviors. 
.355                       
77. I understand all rules and 
procedures required to perform 
my job safely. 
.353                       
82. Employees should 
acknowledge each other for 
especially safe behaviors. 
  -.639                     
81. Employees should caution 
each other about at-risk behaviors. 
  -.636                     
75. If a coworker saw me doing 
something at-risk, I would want 
them to say something to me. 
  -.578                     
76. I use what I learn at work to 
improve safety at home. 
  -.507                     
73. If I have a safety suggestion or 
concern, I let someone know. 
 -.410                     
4. When I see a coworker working 
at-risk, I caution him/her. 
  -.392                     
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
80. I often “short cut” safe work 
practices.  
    .663                   
55. I tend to work more risky 
when supervisors aren‟t present.    
    .620                   
84. Following all safety rules and 
procedures needlessly slows down 
my job. 
    .611                   
79. I only get involved in safety 
activities because I‟m required to 
do so.   
    .547                   
67. Minor injuries often go 
unreported. 
    .485                   
68. Meeting production goals 
often requires employees to put 
themselves at-risk.   
    .480                   
60. My supervisor sometimes 
encourages employees to overlook 
hazards to get the job done.  
    .454     .             
90. Employees caution each other 
about at-risk behaviors. 
      -.643                 
92. Employees appreciate 
feedback from coworkers for at-
risk behaviors. 
      -.598                 
70. Employees acknowledge each 
other for especially safe 
behaviors. 
      -.437                 
43. When employees correct each 
others‟ at-risk behavior, they do 
so respectfully.    
      -.339                 
66. In addition to working safely, 
most employees regularly do 
other things to improve safety.  
      -.355                 
53. Our safety reward/recognition 
program is fair. 
        .759               
51. Our safety reward/recognition 
program(s) encourage employees 
to work safely and participate in 
safety activities. 
        .681               
64. Employees who actively 
participate in safety activities are 
recognized for their efforts. 
        .670               
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
24. Employees are involved in 
designing the safety 
reward/recognition program.  
        .623               
47. Our company recognizes or 
celebrates safety achievements or 
milestones. 
        .604               
78. Employees who work safely 
benefit through either a better 
performance review, chance for 
promotion, better job assignments, 
or some other „perk‟.     
        .567               
65. Employees receive quick 
responses to their safety 
suggestions, whether they are 
accepted or not. 
        .394               
56. Our employee assistance 
program helps people manage 
personal problems which may 
impact safety. 
        .374               
52. Employee safety suggestions 
are taken seriously. 
        .337               
28. My supervisor often gives me 
positive feedback when s/he sees 
me working safely.  
          -.621             
10. My supervisor regularly asks 
employees about safety concerns 
and ideas to improve safety. 
          -.605             
61. My supervisor sets a good 
example for safety through his/her 
own safe behaviors. 
          -.599             
49. My supervisor would give me 
corrective feedback if s/he sees 
me working at-risk.  
          -.575             
3. When my supervisor corrects 
an employee for at-risk behavior, 
s/he does so respectfully.   
          -.558             
63. My supervisor quickly 
addresses identified hazards. 
          -.534             
26. My supervisor clearly sets the 
expectation that employees must 
follow all safety rules and 
procedures. 
          -.528             
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
30. I am comfortable raising 
safety concerns to my supervisor 
and manager. 
          -.421             
9. Senior managers seem 
genuinely interested in reducing 
injuries. 
            -.354           
8. Senior managers spend time 
talking one-on-one with 
employees about safety. 
            -.347           
22. Serious safety violations are 
treated the same whether or not an 
injury occurs.  
              .617         
18. People are disciplined when 
they should be for willful serious 
or repeated safety violations. 
              .615         
69. Managers, supervisors, and 
employees all know what 
behaviors will result in discipline.  
              .595         
88. All factors (e.g., inadequate 
training, production pressure, 
excessive overtime) are 
adequately considered during 
incident analyses.  
              .388         
72. Discipline for safety violations 
is fair and consistent.   
             .376         
83. Hazards are prioritized and 
corrected based on potential for 
injury. 
              .356         
87. All incidents, even minor 
ones, are thoroughly investigated 
if they have potential for serious 
injury. 
              .354         
71. When I have a near miss or 
close call, I report it. 
                .581       
74. If I have a minor injury, I‟ll 
report it.   
                .567       
42. Safety incidents that happen 
within this workplace as well as 
elsewhere are reviewed regularly 
with employees. 
                  -.589     
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
40. Lessons learned from 
incidents and injuries are 
communicated to all relevant 
people. 
                  -.541     
35. Safety rules and procedures 
are regularly reviewed with 
employees. 
                  -.473     
13. The results of safety audits 
and inspections are regularly 
shared with all employees. 
                  -.451     
91. Employees are kept informed 
of the safety committees‟ 
activities.    
                  -.407     
25. Employees are involved in 
conducting safety audits and 
inspections. 
                  -.392     
62. Improvements made from 
employee safety suggestions are 
communicated to all.  
                  -.362     
86. Employees help establish 
and/or change safety rules, 
regulations, policies, and/or 
procedures. 
                  -.358     
15. The organization‟s safety 
improvement goals and efforts are 
regularly discussed with 
employees.   
                  -.354     
11. When an employee is injured, 
he or she will likely be punished 
regardless of the causes and 
circumstances.  
                    .850   
27. Senior managers place most of 
the blame for an injury on the 
injured employee.  
                   .798   
33. Senior managers are more 
concerned about keeping the 
injury statistics low than with 
truly keeping people safe. 
                    .499   
32. Senior managers do not put 
production ahead of safety. 
                      .756 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
23. My supervisor does not put 
production ahead of safety.  
                      .697 
38. Safety is not compromised 
when determining  production 
schedules, overtime, and staffing. 
                      .475 
34. Senior management 
encourages preventive 
maintenance instead of just 
reacting to problems once they 
occur. 
                      .416 
  
HIERARCHICAL ANALYSIS OF A SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY 70 
 
Table 4 
Four Subfactor Intercorrelation Matrix on the 72 Extracted Items 
 MC PR PS SMS 
MC Pearson Correlation 1    
PR Pearson Correlation -.187
**
 1   
PS Pearson Correlation .573
**
 .023
**
 1  
SMS Pearson Correlation .770
**
 -.111
**
 .673
**
 1 
 
Note.  MC = Management Concern for Safety; PR = Personal Responsibility for Safety;  
PS = Peer Support for Safety; SMS = Safety Management Systems 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results: Tests of Model Fit 
Comparable 
Fit Index                                 
 
RMSEA (Root Mean 
Square Error of 
Approximation) 
 
SRMR 
(Standardized 
Root Mean 
Square Residual) 
Value:     .95 Estimate:     0.08 Value:     0.04 
 90 Percent C.I. 
0.082  0.086 
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Table 6 
Theoretical Origin of Items and the Resultant Placement 
Survey Item # Theoretical Origin EFA/HCFA Results 
Q1 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q2 Management Concern Management Concern 
Q3 Management Concern Supervisor Concern 
Q4 Peer Support Peer Support - Caution 
Q5 Peer Support Peer Support 
Q6 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q7 Peer Support Peer Support 
Q8 Management Concern Sr Management Concern 
Q9 Management Concern Sr Management Concern 
Q10 Management Concern Supervisor Concern 
Q11 Safety Management System Supervisor/Management Blame 
Q12 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q13 Safety Management System Communication 
Q14 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q15 Safety Management System Communication 
Q16 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q17 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q18 Safety Management System Discipline and Investigation 
Q19 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q20 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
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Survey Item # Theoretical Origin EFA/HCFA Results 
Q21 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q22 Safety Management System Discipline and Investigation 
Q23 Management Concern Work Pressure 
Q24 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q25 Safety Management System Communication 
Q26 Safety Management System Supervisor Concern 
Q27 Safety Management System Supervisor/Management Blame 
Q28 Management Concern Supervisor Concern 
Q29 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q30 Safety Management System Supervisor Concern 
Q31 Management Concern Management Concern 
Q32 Management Concern Work Pressure 
Q33 Management Concern Supervisor/Management Blame 
Q34 Management Concern Work Pressure 
Q35 Safety Management System Communication 
Q36 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q37 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q38 Management Concern Work Pressure 
Q39 Management Concern Management Concern 
Q40 Safety Management System Communication 
Q41 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q42 Safety Management System Communication 
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Survey Item # Theoretical Origin EFA/HCFA Results 
Q43 Peer Support Peer Support - Respectful Feedback 
Q44 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q45 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q46 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q47 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q48 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q49 Management Concern Supervisor Concern 
Q50 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q51 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q52 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q53 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q54 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q55 Personal Responsibility Risk Taking 
Q56 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q57 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q58 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q59 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q60 Management Concern Risk Taking 
Q61 Management Concern Supervisor Concern 
Q62 Safety Management System Communication 
Q63 Management Concern Supervisor Concern 
Q64 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
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Survey Item # Theoretical Origin EFA/HCFA Results 
Q65 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q66 Safety Management System Peer Support - Respectful Feedback 
Q67 Safety Management System Risk Taking 
Q68 Management Concern Risk Taking 
Q69 Safety Management System Discipline and Investigation 
Q70 Peer Support Peer Support - Respectful Feedback 
Q71 Personal Responsibility Incident Reporting 
Q72 Safety Management System Incident Reporting 
Q73 Personal Responsibility Peer Support – Caution 
Q74 Personal Responsibility Incident Reporting 
Q75 Peer Support Peer Support – Caution 
Q76 Personal Responsibility Peer Support - Caution 
Q77 Safety Management System Training and Rules 
Q78 Safety Management System Rewards and Recognition 
Q79 Personal Responsibility Risk Taking 
Q80 Personal Responsibility Risk Taking 
Q81 Peer Support Peer Support – Caution 
Q82 Peer Support Peer Support – Caution 
Q83 Safety Management System Discipline and Investigation 
Q84 Safety Management System Risk Taking 
Q85 Safety Management System Communication 
Q86 Safety Management System Communication 
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Survey Item # Theoretical Origin EFA/HCFA Results 
Q87 Safety Management System Discipline and Investigation 
Q88 Safety Management System Discipline and Investigation 
Q89 Safety Management System Safety Management System 
Q90 Peer Support Peer Support - Caution 
Q91 Safety Management System Communication 
Q92 Peer Support Peer Support - Respectful Feedback 
 
Note.  EFA = Exploratory Factor Analysis; HCFA = Hierarchical confirmatory factor 
anaylsis. The items which are repeated from the theoretical origin placement in the results 
section, were extracted from the EFA or removed from the HCFA for rational reasons.  
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